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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
James Gerald Beck appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conditional plea of guilty to possession of a controlled substance. Beck claims
the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
While on patrol in Boise, Officer Viens stopped a bicyclist who was riding
without a headlight as required by Boise city code. (9/19/12 Tr., p. 24, L. 10 - p.
25, L. 7.) It was around 11 :30 p.m. (9/19/12 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 15-17.) Viens asked
the bicyclist if he had a front headlight, and the bicyclist responded that he did
not yet.

(Exhibit 1 (audio recording); 9/19/12 Tr., p. 25, Ls. 18-21.)

Viens

identified the bicyclist from his Idaho identification card as James Beck. (Exhibit
1; 9/19/12 Tr., p. 25, L. 22 - p. 26, L. 5.)
Less than 30 seconds into the stop, Viens asked Beck if he had been in
trouble before, and then if he had any active warrants. (Exhibit 1; 9/19/12 Tr., p.
26, L. 23 - p. 27, L. 9.) Beck responded that he had been in trouble for burglary
in the past, but did not think he had any active warrants. (9/19/12 Tr., p. 27, Ls.
2-11.) About 35 to 45 seconds into the stop, Officer Martinez arrived. (9/19/12
Tr., p. 28, Ls. 10-20.) At roughly 45 seconds, Viens asked dispatch to run a
criminal background check on Beck.

(9/19/12 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 12-24.)

Viens

asked Beck where he was coming from and going to; Beck responded he was
coming from work and on his way home. (Exhibit 1; 9/19/12 Tr., p. 26, Ls 18-22.)
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About a minute and 10 seconds into the stop, Viens asked Beck if he was
on probation or parole, and Beck said he was not anymore, but had "topped out
in 2005." (Exhibit 1; 9/19/12 Tr., p. 28, L. 21 - p. 29, L. 2.) When asked, Beck
told Viens he was last arrested two years prior.

(9/19/12 Tr., p. 29, Ls. 3-7.)

During their exchange, Viens received Beck's information from dispatch
confirming that Beck had a criminal history. (9/19/12 Tr., p. 29, Ls. 12-19.) At
about one-and-a-half minutes into the stop, Viens repeated to Beck, "gotta have
a headlight, man." (Exhibit 1.)
Just over two minutes into the stop, and right after Viens received
information back from dispatch, Viens asked Beck if he had anything illegal on
him. (Exhibit 1; 9/19/12 Tr., p. 29, Ls. 20-23.) Beck responded by asking, "am I
going to jail?" (Exhibit 1.) After Viens repeated his question, Beck answered
yes, and said it was a diabetic syringe. (Exhibit 1; 9/19/12 Tr., p. 30, Ls. 2-9.)
Viens followed by asking Beck if he had anything else, specifically "meth," and
Beck nodded affirmatively. (Exhibit 1; 9/19/12 Tr., p. 30, Ls. 14-22.)
Viens handcuffed Beck and conducted a search of Beck's person.
(9/19/12 Tr., p. 31, Ls. 2-23.) In the search, Viens found a syringe and a small
plastic baggie of a crystalline substance. (9/19/12 Tr., p. 32, Ls. 7-8.) From the
initial stop to when Beck was handcuffed, approximately three minutes passed.
(9/19/12 Tr., p. 33, Ls. 11-12; Exhibit 1.)
The state charged Beck with possession of methamphetamine and
possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp. 23-24.) Beck moved to suppress the
state's evidence. (R., pp. 26-27, 36-41.) At a hearing on the motion, Viens and
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Beck both testified. (9/19/12 Tr.; R., p. 50.) At the conclusion of the testimony,
Beck's counsel conceded,
the stop didn't exceed what was necessary to carry out the purpose
of the stop. I don't think there is any question that that is probably
true. A typical infraction would probably take ten or 15 minutes to
write out and that interaction was fairly brief. So I concede that.
(9/19/12 Tr., p. 52, Ls. 19-25.)

Counsel repeatedly characterized the "very

narrow issue" before the court as whether questions asked by Officer Viens were
carefully tailored to the purpose of the stop. (9/19/12 Tr., p. 46, L. 8 - p. 49, L.
21; p. 53, Ls. 1-12.)
Finding that Beck "conceded the duration of the stop was reasonable," the
district court concluded that Viens' questions were not an impermissible
expansion of the stop. (R., p. 55.) The district court thus denied Beck's motion.
(R., pp. 53-56.)

Beck then entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of

methamphetamine, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression
motion. (R., pp. 59-60.) The district court sentenced Beck to seven years with
two years fixed. (R., pp. 71-73.) Beck timely appealed. (R., pp. 75-77.)
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ISSUE
Beck states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Beck's motion to suppress the
State's evidence?
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Beck failed to show that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress?
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ARGUMENT
Beck Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion
To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Beck argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 5-14.)

According to Beck, Officer Viens unreasonably

extended the duration of his stop by asking questions unrelated to the stop's
purpose.

(Appellant's brief pp. 5-14.)

However, at his suppression hearing,

Beck's trial counsel expressly waived the issue whether Viens unreasonably
extended the stop's duration, conceding, "the stop didn't exceed what was
necessary to carry out the purpose for the stop." (9/19/12 Tr., p. 52, Ls. 19-21.)
In making these closing comments to the court, Beck conceded that "the
duration of the stop was reasonable." (R., p. 55.)
Relying on Beck's concession, the district court concluded that "Officer
Viens did not impermissibly expand the scope of questioning beyond the original
justification for the stop," and denied the motion to suppress.

(R., pp. 55-56.)

Thus, the district court reached its decision without making an independent
determination whether the duration of the stop was reasonable. Because Beck
expressly waived the issue whether the duration of the stop was reasonable,
there was no adverse ruling on the issue about which Beck can assert error on
appeal.

And Beck's attempt to deny that concession and reframe it as an

erroneous finding by the district court fails.
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Alternatively, even if this Court addresses Beck's appellate claim that
Viens' questioning unreasonably prolonged the duration of the stop, the claim
fails. Application of the law to the facts shows no Fourth Amendment violation.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing a district court's ruling on a suppression motion, the appellate

court accepts the district court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous, but
freely reviews the application of law to those facts. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho
576, 592, 261 P.3d 853, 869 (2011) (citation omitted).

C.

Beck's Trial Counsel Conceded That The Duration Of The Stop Was
Reasonable, Thus He Cannot Show The District Court Erred Or That This
Court Should Otherwise Consider The Issue, Which He Expressly Waived
Below
Beck moved to suppress evidence obtained in Officer Viens' investigative

detention,

asserting

Amendment.

the

detention

(R., pp. 36-41.)

was

unreasonable

under the

Fourth

The Fourth Amendment protects against

unreasonable searches and seizures.

U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,

878 (1975); State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012). "An
investigative detention is a seizure of limited duration to investigate suspected
criminal activity."

State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641,644, 181 P.3d 1249, 1252

(Ct. App. 2008) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).

There is no Fourth

Amendment violation where an officer conducts an investigative detention with a
"reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity [is] afoot," based on facts
available at the time.

~

An investigative detention supported by reasonable

suspicion must be temporary and last no longer than "necessary to effectuate
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the purpose of the stop." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). "[G]eneral
questioning on topics unrelated

to the purpose of the stop is permissible so long

as it does not expand the duration of the stop." Stewart, 145 Idaho at 647, 181
P.3d at 1255 (citing State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 362, 17 P.3d 301, 306
(Ct. App. 2000)).
At his suppression hearing, Beck's counsel conceded the reasonableness
of his stop's duration, offering in final comments

to the district court:

I'll concede that the stop didn't exceed what was
necessary to carry out the purpose for the stop. I don't think
there is any question that that is probably true. A typical infraction
would probably take ten or 15 minutes to write out and that
interaction was fairly brief. So I concede that.
(9/19/12 Tr., p. 52, Ls. 16-25 (emphasis added).)

Counsel's choice of words

largely mirrors the language used by the United States Supreme Court in Royer,
460 U.S. at 500. Beck's trial counsel then told the district court that the issue
was "whether or not the questioning was carefully tailored to the purpose for the
stop." (9/19/12 Tr., p. 53, Ls. 1-12; see also 9/19/12 Tr., p. 46, L. 8-p. 49, L.
21.) "Defendant having conceded the duration of the stop was reasonable," the
district court concluded Viens' questions were within the scope of the "original
justification for the stop," and denied the suppression motion. (R., pp. 55-56.)
For the first time on appeal, Beck challenges the district court's finding
that trial counsel conceded the duration of the stop was reasonable. (Appellant's
brief, pp. 7-8.)

Beck now asserts that his trial counsel -

despite his

unambiguous comments - "never abandoned the claim that Officer Viens'
questions temporarily extended the stop in a manner which was unreasonable."
(Appellant's brief, p. 7.) Beck contends that his characterization of trial counsel's
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closing comments is "consistent with the memorandum filed in support of his
suppression motion."

(Appellant's brief, p. 8.)

Beck's argument is irrelevant.

The district court found that trial counsel made the concession at issue "in
closing argument at the hearing on the suppression motion." (R., p. 55.) The
record supports this finding. That Beck now wishes to advance the argument he
made in briefing before the suppression hearing does not show clear error in the
district court's finding that the argument was conceded by counsel at that
hearing. See Draper, 151 Idaho at 592, 261 P.3d at 869.
The Idaho Supreme Court has declined to address an issue that was
raised in briefing to the trial court, but expressly waived at oral argument before
the trial court. Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Cy. of Kootenai, 151 Idaho 405, 409,
258 P.3d 340, 344 (2011 ). This is appropriate because, "[t]o raise an issue on
appeal, the record must contain an adverse ruling to form the basis for
assignment of error and this Court will not consider or review an issue raised for
the first time on appeal."

Magnuson Properties Partnership v. City of Coeur

D'Alene, 138 Idaho 166, 170, 59 P.3d 971, 975 (2002) (citation omitted). The
record here contains no adverse ruling to which Beck can assign error.

The

district court denied Beck's suppression motion based on Beck's trial counsel's
concession, without making a determination on the issue.

Because the issue

was not ruled upon by the court below, it is inappropriate for review by this Court
on appeal under well-established applicable law.
To the extent Beck argues the district court erred in concluding Beck's
stop was reasonable in duration, his argument fails under the doctrine of invited
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error. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-13.) Under the doctrine, a party is estopped "from
asserting an error when his or her own conduct induces the commission of the
error." State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 915, 265 P.3d 519, 528 (Ct. App. 2011)
(citation omitted). The district court's determination that "the duration of the stop
was reasonable" rested upon the express language of Beck's closing comment
at oral argument that "the duration of the stop did not exceed what was
necessary for the purpose of the stop." (R., p. 55; 9/19/12 Tr., p. 52, Ls. 19-21.)
Because the district court's allegedly erroneous determination resulted from
Beck's trial counsel's argument, the invited error doctrine estops Beck from
asserting error.
Given the unequivocal concession by Beck's trial counsel that the duration
of the stop was reasonable, Beck has failed to show the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress.

Further, Beck has failed to show this Court

should consider the reasonableness of his stop's duration - an issue he
expressly waived below, and for which there is therefore no adverse ruling for
'

this Court to review.
D.

Even If The Court Considers Beck's Appellate Claim, Application Of The
Law To The Facts Shows That Viens' Questioning Did Not Unreasonably
Prolong Beck's Detention
Even if this Court finds that Beck's trial counsel did not concede that the

duration of his stop was reasonable, the record supports such a finding. "Where
the lower court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory, [the appellate]
Court will affirm the order on the correct theory." Markel lnt'I. Ins. Co., Ltd. v.
Erekson, 153 Idaho 107,113,279 P.3d 93, 99 (2012) (citation omitted).
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Applying the law to the facts, there was no Fourth Amendment violation resulting
from Beck's detention.
In determining the reasonableness of a detention, the courts are guided
by "common sense and ordinary human experience." Stewart, 145 Idaho at 64546, 181 P.3d at 1253-54 (citing U.S. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985), and U.S. v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989)). "[B]rief inquiries not otherwise related to the
initial purpose of the stop do not necessarily violate a detainee's Fourth
Amendment rights." State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d 128, 134
(Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted). The United States Supreme Court has held,
"An officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop
... do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so
long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop."
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009).
Less than two months after Arizona v. Johnson was decided, the Idaho
Court of Appeals held, "if an officer questions a driver about matters unrelated to
the traffic stop after the purpose of the stop has been fulfilled, the questioning,
no matter how short, extends the duration of the stop and is an unwarranted
intrusion." State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 8,217 P.3d 1, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). But
Beck has not shown that the purpose of his stop was fulfilled.
"Brief,

general questions about drugs and weapons,

in and

of

themselves, do not extend an otherwise lawful detention." State v. Grantham,
146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Parkinson, 135
Idaho at 362-63, 17 P.3d at 306-07.

A request to search a suspect's truck
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before handing the suspect a written citation for speeding, which was the basis
for the initial stop, did not unlawfully extend the stop in State v. Silva, 134 Idaho
848, 853, 11 P.3d 44, 49 (Ct. App. 2000). In that case, the Court recognized that
police officers have some discretion in procedures for conducting traffic stops.

&

(citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n. 6 (1977)). The Silva

Court held, "The additional second or two that [the officer] took to ask for consent
[to conduct a search] and in which Silva replied in the affirmative was objectively
reasonable."

&

Here, the additional second or two that it took Viens to ask Beck if he had
anything illegal on him and in which Beck replied in the affirmative, was also
objectively reasonable.

(Exhibit 1.) When Beck answered in the affirmative,

Viens had reasonable grounds to follow up with further questions about illegal
items in his possession, even if unrelated to Beck's lack of a front headlight. See
Grantham, 146 Idaho at 496, 198 P3d at 134.

Viens' questions did not

"measurably extend" his stop, but were brief, general inquiries within a
reasonable timeframe and before the conclusion of Beck's stop. See Johnson,
555 U.S. at 333; Grantham, 146 Idaho at 496, 198 P.3d at 134; Silva, 134 Idaho
at 853, 11 p.3d at 49. Because the record supports that the duration of Beck's
detention was reasonable, this Court should affirm the district court's order.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order denying Beck's motion to suppress.
DATED this 18th day of November, 2013.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 18th day of November, 2013, served
a true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
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DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
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